趨向與執持：胡塞爾現象學中的興趣概念

“Tending-towards and still-keeping-in-grip”: The Concept of Interest in Husserl’s Phenomenology

儘管研究者們普遍意識到了注意力與興趣現象間的差異及胡塞爾前後期興趣概念的變化，但在胡塞爾詮釋傳統中，對興趣的研究始終被局限於注意力理論的框架內。在本文中，我嘗試揭示胡塞爾靜態現象學中興趣與注意力概念間發生分異的具體路徑以及發生現象學中作為感受的興趣定義的重新確立過程。在此基礎上，我重構了以感受為動機的認識興趣模型，並對《經驗與判斷》中狹義與廣義的「朝向興趣」以及後期手稿文本中的兩類「非朝向興趣」做出定義。這種擴展後的興趣概念對理解胡塞爾後期文本中清醒自我的「我在」及自我時間化建構具有關鍵作用。

Although researchers have widely recognized the differences between the phenomena of attention and interest, as well as the changes in Husserl’s concept of interest over time, studies on interest within the tradition of Husserlian interpretation have remained confined to the framework of attention theory. In this paper, I attempt to reveal the specific path through which the concepts of interest and attention diverged in Husserl's static phenomenology, as well as the process of re-establishing the definition of interest as feeling in genetic phenomenology. On this basis, I reconstruct a model of cognitive interest motivated by feeling and define both the narrow and broad meanings of the interest as“turning-towards”in Experience and Judgment, as well as two types of interest without turning-towards in his later manuscript texts. This expanded concept of interest plays a crucial role in understanding the“I am”(Ich-bin) of the wakeful I and the constitution of active temporalization in Husserl’s later writings.