搭售對競爭對手創新誘因的影響

The effect of bundling on R&D incentives

本文試圖以不確定研發解釋 Whinston (2001) 所提「搭售也許會提高競爭對手創新誘因」的主張。搭售有可能影響競爭對手的創新誘因，也可能會左右自己的研發支出。如果搭售可以延伸壟斷力，則對手會處於更不利的競爭地位，只有期待熊彼得模式再一次實現，透過研發取得重大創新，才有可能成為新一代的霸主。設若如此，搭售將提高競爭對手的創新誘因。另一方面，如果創新的幅度不夠震撼，無法撼動搭售廠商的地位，即使研發成功，依然有可能敵不過搭售所延伸的壟斷力，而被趕出市場。那麼，再多的研發支出恐怕只會石沉大海，而此將減損競爭對手的創新誘因。就搭售廠商而言，如果透過搭售可以獲得更高的利潤，就更有本錢可以支應研發經費，透過新的創新可以更加穩固既有的壟斷地位。另一方面，當競爭對手透過研發，在被搭售產品有重大創新時，如果沒有搭售，則搭售廠商之被搭售產品將被逐出市場。惟若透過搭售之壟斷力延伸，能避免被搭售產品被趕出市場，那麼，搭售廠商可能就不會積極的創新。

This note tries to explain the argument of Whinston (2001) that ''tying may increase the incentives for rivals to innovate'' in terms of uncertain R&D. Tying may affect the innovation incentives of rivals, and may also influence the R&D expenditures of the firm possibly with bundling strategy. If tying can extend the monopoly power, the rival will be in a more unfavorable competition position. Only by drastic innovations through R&D can it become a leader of new generation. If so, tying will increase the incentives for rivals to innovate. On the other hand, if the innovation is non-drastic, the rival may still be unable to compete with the firm possibly with bundling strategy and be driven out of the market even if it is the winner of the innovation. So, no matter how much R&D expenditures, it will only be sunk and this will reduce the incentives for rivals to innovate. As far as the firm possibly with bundling strategy is concerned, if it can obtain higher profits through tying, it will have more capital to support R&D expenditures, and new innovations can further stabilize their existing monopoly position. On the other hand, when a rival has made drastic innovations in the tied product through R&D, if there is no tying, the tied product of the firm possibly with bundling strategy will be driven out of the market. However, if the tied product can be prevented from being driven out of the market through the extension of the monopoly power of tying, then the firm possibly with bundling strategy may not innovate aggressively.