非主管職員工薪酬揭露、薪資調整與盈餘資訊性

The Disclosure of Non-Executive Compensation, Salary Adjustments and Earnings Imformativeness

金管會規定上市櫃公司自2019年起須於公開資訊觀測站中揭露「非擔任主管職務之全時員工薪資資訊」，據此，本研究擬檢視我國非主管職員工薪酬揭露政策下，資本市場投資者對於被警示公司，是否會因其較忽視員工權益、以及被警示公司之薪酬調整政策、被警示公司與非警示公司之轉變等因素，進而影響公司之盈餘資訊性。研究樣本選自2019年至2020年間之臺灣上市櫃公司。實證結果顯示，並未觀察到前一年度列為被警示的公司，次年之盈餘資訊性顯著較差的證據；此外，研究發現當被警示公司薪資調整幅度高於同業平均時，盈餘資訊性較高，若再將被警示公司分為三類時，則當企業為第二類（公司獲利表現（EPS）較同業佳，但非主管職員工薪資平均數低於同業之公司）被警示公司時會增加盈餘資訊性。最後，若企業由被警示公司轉為非警示公司時，盈餘資訊性未受影響，而當企業由非警示公司轉為被警示公司時，盈餘資訊性顯著較低，亦即市場給予負面反應。本研究結果除可豐富有關非主管職員工薪酬相關議題之研究，尤其對於資本市場以及公司內部管理面之影響外，研究發現亦具政策意涵，結果可供主管機關對於非主管職員工薪酬資訊揭露政策修訂之參考。

The Financial Supervisory Commission of Taiwan mandates that listed and OTC companies disclose compensation information for non-executive full-time employees on the Market Observation Post System starting from 2019. This study aims to examine under this disclosure policy, whether capital market investors are influenced by factors such as a company's disregard for employee rights, the compensation adjustment policies of warned companies, and the transitions from warned to non-warned companies, ultimately affecting the informativeness of the company's earnings. The study analyzed the data from listed and OTC companies from 2019 to 2020 in Taiwan. The empirical findings suggest that there is no significant evidence of lower earnings informativeness in the subsequent year for companies previously listed as warned. However, it is observed that higher earnings informativeness for warned companies whose salary adjustments exceed the industry average. When further classifying warned companies into three categories, companies in the second category (those with better EPS performance than peers but lower average non-executive salaries) show increased earnings informativeness. Finally, transitioning from a warned to a non-warned status does not affect earnings informativeness, but moving from a non-warned to a warned status results in significantly lower informativeness, indicating a negative market reaction. The findings of this study not only enrich the research related to non-executive employee compensation but also elucidate the impacts on the capital market and internal corporate management. Additionally, the results carry policy implications, providing guidance for regulatory authorities in refining disclosure policies regarding non-executive employee compensation.