管理能力對於股價崩跌的影響──管理階層特徵的調節效果

The Effect of Managerial Ability on Stock Price Crashes - The Moderating Effect of Management Characteristics

本文以效率契約與尋租理論兩種觀點，探討管理能力對於個股股價崩跌的影響。本文以台灣上市公司實證結果顯示，管理能力與股價崩跌風險有顯著的正相關，符合尋租理論。本文進一步實證顯示基於競賽激勵，管理階層的薪酬對於管理能力與公司股價崩跌風險之關聯性有正向調節效果。基於利益收斂觀點，經理人持股比率對於管理能力與股價崩跌風險之關聯性有負向調節效果。最後本文實證發現過度投資在管理能力與公司股價崩跌風險之關係具有中介效果。本文實證結果說明管理能力也有損害投資人財富的負面影響。

This research examines how managerial ability affects firm-specific stock price crashes based on efficient contracting and rent-seeking theories. According to data from listed companies in Taiwan, the study finds a significant positive relationship between managerial ability and crash risk, supporting the rent-seeking theory. It also shows that tournament-based managerial compensation positively moderates the relationship, while managerial ownership negatively influences it. Moreover, over-investment is identified as a mediator in this relationship. In summary, the findings highlight that managerial ability may also have a detrimental effect on investor wealth.