離職金為員工選任之工具

Pay-to-Quit as a Means for Employee Selection

本研究以個案公司為研究對象，欲了解離職金是否能成為有效的員工選任工具讓不適任之員工自願性的離開，同時讓適任的員工選擇繼續留下。實證結果顯示，相對於領取離職金且自願離開的試用業務人員，選擇留任之試用業務人員確實有較好銷售件數，且銷售案件之金額也較高。此外，實證結果進一步發現，相對於只以單一傳統面試下所選入的試用業務人員，以傳統面試輔以離職金方案所選入且留任之試用業務人員有較長的留任天數以及較好的業績表現。整體而言，實證解果顯示離職金為一個有效的選任工具。

This study uses data from a real estate company to investigate whether a pay-to-quit program can be a valid selection mechanism that encourages ill-fitting employees to voluntarily leave but retains better fitting employees. The empirical results indicate that probationary sales agents who stayed sold more and higher-valued houses than those who took the payment and left the company. To further explore whether the pay-to-quit program can improve the matching quality of hired probationary sales agents, we examine whether probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed would show a higher level of matching quality in terms of duration and job performance than those who were only selected through the traditional interview. The results indicate that probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed show a lower rate of departure and better job performance. The results provide evidence that a pay-to-quit program can serve as a useful selection mechanism.