休耕政策對經濟成長與社會福利的影響

The Impact of Fallow Policy on Economic Growth and Social Welfare

本文建構一個中間財農產品市場具有不完全競爭特質的內生成長模型，探討政府當局以休耕補助政策如何達成產出成長率極大與社會福利極大政策目標，以及中間財廠商獨占力扮演的角色。根據本文的研究指出：首先，休耕補助政策可以引導農產中間財廠商增加休耕比率，有助於涵養地力；特別是農產中間財廠商的獨占力越大，增加休耕比率越大，越能增強涵養地力效果。第二，休耕補貼率對經濟成長率和福利水準有正向的影響，而追求經濟成長率極大和福利極大目標時，中間財廠商的獨占力扮演關鍵角色。第三，福利極大的最適獨占力指標大於成長率極大最適獨占力指標。

This paper uses agricultural intermediate goods in an imperfect competition market to construct an endogenous growth model and explore the effectiveness of fallow subsidy policies by the government to maximize output growth rate and social welfare. Our results show that the fallow subsidy policy may contribute to soil fertility as the fallow ratio increases from the agricultural intermediate firms. Furthermore, we also find that a more prominent firm’s monopoly power may assist the fallow ratio and soil fertility. The fallow subsidy rate positively impacts economic growth and social welfare. When aiming for the maximum economic growth rate and welfare, the monopoly power of intermediate goods firms plays a crucial role. Finally, the optimal monopoly power index for maximizing welfare is greater than the optimal monopoly power index for maximizing the growth rate.