經濟政策不確定性對非公認盈餘品質之影響

The Impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty on Non-GAAP Earnings’Quality

本研究旨在探討經濟政策不確定性（簡稱政策不確定性）透過引發暫時性項目之認列，是否會逐步促使公司自願性揭露非公認盈餘，及政策不確定性對排除品質的影響。本研究以2003至2017年間美國上市公司為研究對象，獲得實證結果如下：(1)政策不確定性愈大，認列暫時性項目與自願性揭露非公認盈餘可能性之正向關係增額愈強；(2)有揭露非公認盈餘時，政策不確定性愈大，排除品質愈高；(3)政策不確定性愈大，上述公司所排除之暫時性項目愈多。此外，分析師所扮演之外部監督角色能額外強化政策不確定性，促進排除品質效果。最後，政策不確定性愈大，自願性揭露非公認盈餘愈能額外降低資訊不對稱。以上發現支持公司從事非公認盈餘揭露之資訊性動機。

This study investigates the role of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the relation between the special item (SPI) recognition and the voluntary non-GAAP earning disclosure, and EPU’s effect on the exclusion quality. By examining a sample of US listed firms ranging from 2003 to 2017, we find that (1) the incremental relation between the SPI recognition and the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is positive under higher EPU; (2) the relation between EPU and the exclusion quality is positive for firms with voluntary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings; (3) firms exclude more SPIs under higher EPU. In addition, the monitoring role of analysts makes the positive effect of EPU on exclusion quality stronger. Finally, the incremental relationship between the voluntary non-GAAP earning disclosure and information asymmetry is negative under higher EPU. These findings sustain the informative motive for non-GAAP earnings disclosure.