股東參與及公司治理

Shareholder Participation and Corporate Governance

儘管背後的驅動因素各異，近來美國公司治理實務上之機構投資人及散戶投資人對於公司治理之參與均有顯著提升，並對美國公司法制帶來影響。此等股東參與提升現象，促使吾人重新省思董事經營權力之正當性基礎。對此，本文參照政治哲學中之審議民主理論而倡導審議式公司治理，主張董事權力之正當性不應僅立基於董事為股東所選舉之上，董事應再與股東進行審議，方足以確立其決策於公司內部之正當性，而在內部正當性之外，本文並主張在公司在其決策將影響利害關係人時，應就其主張與立場，與受影響的利害關係人審議，以建立該等決策的外部正當性。在此基礎上，本文檢視主管機關所提出的歷次公司治理藍圖，並探討股東會與董事會之權限分際，而為若干思考。

Despite their different motivating factors, recently in the U.S. corporate governance practices, institutional investors and retail investors increasingly participate in the corporate governance of US companies, and the participation further affect the development of US corporate law. Such phenomenon prompts us to reconsider the legitimate basis of directors’ruling authority in corporate management. Referring to the deliberative democracy theory in the political philosophy, this article argues the basis of directors’authority should not merely be based on the exercise of shareholder franchise. Rather, directors should also engage in deliberation with shareholders to establish the internal legitimacy of their corporate decisions within the corporation. In addition, when directors’decisions will affect stakeholders, the directors should also engage in deliberation with the affected stakeholders to gain external legitimacy. Based on the discussions above, this article further reviews the sequential corporate governance roadmaps brought by the agency-in-charge and explores the boundary of corporate powers between the shareholders’meeting and the board meeting from the perspective of the deliberative democracy theory.