法律問題與事實問題的區分：以經驗法則為例

Distinguishing Questions of Law and Questions of Fact: An Example from the Rule of Experience

本文以最高法院69年台上字第771號前判例作為觀察對象，探討實務上將經驗法則的違反視為法律問題，因此容許上訴至最高法院的理論根據。本文觀察到，學說上在處理經驗法則上訴問題的時候，會先將經驗法則定性為法律問題或事實問題，再附帶地加上「第三審合法性要件」的論理步驟，構成二階段的審查架構。這種審查架構不僅存在內部矛盾性，亦無助、甚至有害於當前金字塔訴訟制度改革趨勢下，促進最高法院的法律解釋功能與減少案源等訴訟政策的實現。本文認為，應檢討二階段理論的架構，廢棄過去從本質論探究法律問題與事實問題的立場，重新從政策論的觀點，功能性地依據最高法院的現行定位與改革目標，思考法律問題的區分意義。最後，本文從法律論理的角度指出，法律續造－特別是規則的限縮與擴充－的過程中法律問題如何與事實認定功能互為表裡，由此證明事實問題與法律問題兩者無法也沒有必要截然二分。傳統上從本質論截然二分法律問題與事實問題的觀點阻礙了法律審被賦予的法律續造功能。本文的結論是，現在在推行的嚴格法律審不應被理解為純粹針對法律問題的審查，而應政策性地思考上訴容許性的問題，並在容許事實論述檢驗規範論述的情況下，允許事實問題一併上訴的可能性。

One of the goals of the recent judicial reform in Taiwan is to reshape the court system into a pyramid, and this goal can only be reached if the current caseload of the supreme courts is reduced. The official approach to reduce the caseload of the highest courts is to restrict appealable cases to ‘strict legal questions’. This paper argues that the current approach would only hinder the reform if the notion of ‘strict legal questions’ is understood in a dichotomous and essentialist sense. Instead, this paper suggests a policy-oriented approach to classify questions of law vis-à-vis questions of facts. This would enable the supreme courts to fulfill their designated functions of Rechtsfortbildung (further development of the law), unifying legal views and resolving questions of principle importance. The last part of this paper examines the reasoning process of Rechtsfortbildung, which involves building exceptions to and extensions of existing legal rules. It demonstrates how questions of facts invite lawyers into a context of doubt, a precondition of a reevaluation of existing legal rules, and that some questions of facts have to be part of an appeal to facilitate rule changing.