| 英文摘要 |
This paper discusses determinants that potentially affect individuals’decisions on adding excess liability insurance in their voluntary third-party liability insurance. The findings reveal that individuals exposed to high risks are more likely to purchase excess liability insurance, which hints at the presence of adverse selection. Specifically, insured individuals who purchase excess liability insurance tend to exhibit higher claim rates and claim amounts, which may imply an ex-ante moral hazard. Furthermore, individuals who add excess liability insurance often have a lower voluntary third-party liability insurance coverage amount than do those without excess liability insurance, indicating excess liability insurance as a substitute for voluntary third-party liability insurance instead of serving a complementary function. This phenomenon reflects the unfair pricing of insurance rates. Moreover, compared with other insurance sales channels, customers of automobiles dealers less often purchase excess liability insurance, indicating that such dealers lack the motives to promote excess liability insurance. Furthermore, automobile pricing is significantly positively correlated with the purchase of excess liability insurance, suggesting that high-income individuals exhibit higher needs for excess liability insurance. Finally, insured older adults demonstrate lower needs for excess liability insurance, possibly due to a decrease in self-perceived risk among this age group. |