董事超額薪酬與投資效率之關聯性

The Relationship of Directors’Excess Compensation and Investment Efficiency

本研究以2008年至2020年台灣上市與上櫃公司為研究對象，探討董事超額薪酬與投資效率之關聯性。實證結果發現董事超額薪酬與過度投資呈現正向關聯，但超額薪酬與投資不足並未具有關聯性，部分支持董事超額薪酬對投資效率會出現負向影響。除此之外，本研究發現董事超額薪酬和過度投資的正向相關在虧損公司將更加獲得支持，有可能是肥貓董事亦傾向過度投資以期望高風險性投資可以為公司帶來較高的報酬。

This study investigates the relationship of directors’excess compensation and investment efficiency by examining the sample of Taiwan listed and OTC companies from 2008 to 2020. We find that directors' excess compensation is positively associated with over-investment, but there is no significant relationship between directors’excess compensation and under-investment. Thus, the empirical results partially support the negative impact of directors' excess compensation on investment efficiency. In addition, we find that the positively association between directors’excess compensation and investment efficiency is stronger in loss companies. It may be that Fat Cat directors tend to over-invest in the hope that high-risk investments can bring higher returns to the company.