| 英文摘要 |
After the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn’s views began to shift, leading to some confusion regarding his statements. This article has two main objectives: To clarify Kuhn’s claim that“scientific rationality had to be ascribed to individuals”and to provide a reasonable explanation for the dramatic shift in his thinking later in life. From the perspective of the history of the philosophy of science, I will trace Kuhn’s development from his early sociological focus on“the community as the agent”to his later move towards individualism and a priori philosophy. I will explain how he applied his unique notion of scientific rationality to individuals in his later years, demonstrating that this view aligns with a form of individual instrumental rationality. Kuhn’s intellectual change, and his insistence on the individualization of scientific rationality, was not only a response to rationalist philosophical challenges but also a reaction to the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, particularly his opposition to its radical relativism in the 1970s. |