經理人過度自信與產業專精會計師之選擇

Managerial Overconfidence and the Selection of Industry-Specialist Auditors

過去文獻指出，經理人之過度自信會影響其財務報導行為，而會計師選擇為公司價值訊號傳遞(signaling)策略中很重要的一環。對過度自信經理人而言，聘任具較高查核品質的產業專精會計師，可提升外界對其財務報導品質的觀感及信賴程度；另一方面，過度自信經理人亦可能因產業專精會計師對客戶財務報導品質的更高要求，而對聘任產業專精會計師有所顧慮。本研究以2011至2018年臺灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，依會計師選擇之可能影響因素進行傾向分數配對；利用配對後樣本探討經理人過度自信是否與其產業專精會計師之選擇有關。實證結果顯示，經理人過度自信對於其產業專精會計師之選擇有顯著正面之影響。

Prior studies have suggested that managers' overconfidence affects their financial reporting behavior; meanwhile, auditors play a significant role in the financial reporting of companies, and the choice of auditor is an important part of the company's value-signaling strategy. While engaging industry specialist auditors who demonstrated higher audit quality may enhance the perception and credibility of financial reports prepared by overconfident managers, it may inhibit their extreme financial reporting behavior. The purpose of this study is to explore the association between managers’overconfidence and their choice of industry specialist auditors by utilizing Taiwan-listed companies from 2011 to 2018 and match them with propensity scores according to the influencing factors of the companies' choice of auditors. Empirical results show that managers with higher overconfidence deviation are more likely to choose industry specialists to audit their financial statements.