早期超驗觀念論的自由概念與行動理論轉向

本文目標是重構早期超驗觀念論與行動理論的轉向，特別以萊恩浩(Karl Leonard Reinhold) 1792年出版的《康德哲學書簡：卷二》(Briefeüber die Kantische Philosophie: Zweiter Band)為重點。筆者首先解釋康德自由理論的內部疑難，特別是：其將自由與道德兩者等同，排除感性作為道德的基礎，將無法解釋道德善惡的問題。然後，筆者引入施密特的批評，其指出：將自由限制在實踐理性之上，無法體現自由。理性內部也是充滿了因果必然性，會產生智性命定論的難題，直接將自由歸於偶然因素。再者，筆者重構萊恩浩的論證，解決方法是將實踐理性與意志分離，並將後者視為絕對自由狀態，作為選擇遵守或違反道德律則的能力。絕對自由不表示將自由行動視為偶然事件，而是一原初未決定的狀態。萊恩浩的論證，正好顯示由道德形上學，過渡到行動理論轉折，將自由從可能性轉化成實在性。最後，筆者區分萊恩浩與康德的系統，總結兩者分別代表早期觀念論的兩種不同的自由型態。

This article explores the transition in early Transcendental Idealism regarding freedom and the theory of action, specifically focusing on Karl Leonard Reinhold’s work from 1792—“Briefeüber die Kantische Philosophie: Zweiter Band.”First, I outline the challenges within Kant’s theory of freedom, such as identifying freedom with morality, excluding sensibility as the foundation for action, and the difficulty in addressing moral good and evil. Then, I introduce Schmid’s critique of Kant, which confines freedom to practical reason but falls short of realizing freedom. This limitation arises due to natural necessity within reason, leading to the dilemma of intelligible fatalism and rendering freedom contingent. Then I reconstruct Reinhold’s argument, offering a solution that distinguishes practical reason from the will. This approach identifies the will as an absolute state of freedom, capable of choosing to obey or violate moral laws. Absolute freedom does not mean treating free actions as arbitrary events but signifies an original-undetermined state. Reinhold’s argument illustrates the transition from the metaphysics of moral to the theory of action, in which freedom evolves from mere possibility to reality. Finally, I differentiate between Reinhold’s and Kant’s systems and summarize how each represents two distinct forms of freedom in early idealism.