公共選擇途徑下官僚行為理論之實證研究以臺北市政府「政府線上申辦服務政策」為例   全文下載

An Empirical Study of Bureaucratic Behavior in the Public Choice Theory：A Case of Taipei Government’s“Governmental On-Line Application Service”

公共選擇理論當中的官僚行為研究，可以Niskanen（1971）的「官員與代議制政府」一書為其濫觴。該理論認為官僚的諸項自利動機造成渠等試圖擴大預算的企圖，而學界的辯論亦多從此處開展，試圖尋找各項實證案例來證實或否證官僚最大化預算的現象。惟本文經文獻探討發現，官僚的預算最大化企圖並非最根本的官僚自利動機，更基本的動機包括：自由裁量權、工作的物理環境、公共服務的動機、安定性等等。而為能有案例可供佐證，以免落入意識形態的爭辯，本研究選擇台北市政府「政府線上申辦服務政策」作為觀察對象，經統計分析後發現，上述各項不同的官僚動機對於官僚行為確實產生不同型態的影響，此項發現可作為日後政府思考政策執行時的官僚面向之重要參考。

The bureaucratic behavior research of public choice theory begins with Niskanen’s”Bureaucracy and representative government”. In the book, Niskanen regards many self-interest motivations of bureaucracy make they try to maximize budgets. In order to prove of false maximize-budget behavior, Scholars try to find cases to test.
However, after surveyed relative research, we find not maximize-budget but administrative discretion, physical environment and public-service motivations, and stability etc are the basic motivations of bureaucracy. Finally, to avoid meaningless dispute, we choice Taipei city government’s Governmental on-line applying service to test our hypothesis. By statistic analysis, this article concludes different motivation would product different affection.