| 英文摘要 |
Regarding performance appraisal for civil service, one of research focuses is on the personal ability of supervisors in performance rating, with“rating error”as a key issue. This is further attributed to the“bounded rationality”as the root of the problem, which is explored to explain why supervisors rate their subordinates in accordance with non-working-performance factors, i.e., by applying“hidden rules.”However, this paper argues that the“rating error”in the public sector is inevitable. The mechanism of the“75% cap for Grade A rating”is essentially leading to“rating error.”Interestingly, the application of this mechanism invalidates the argument of“bounded rationality”for its impact on the distorted performance appraisal behavior.
This study makes use of in-depth interviews with 12 senior executives in a local government to illustrate the complexity of the distorted performance appraisal behavior. The behavior is subject to the influence of external pressure of accountability, the inherent incentive structure and the job nature of their agencies. The application of“hidden rules”is not completely unjustifiable. This paper suggests that when it comes to performance appraisal, we should not focus too much on the factors of supervisors, because they face enormous pressure from outside and within their agencies. The low measurability of the public sector performance and ingrained organizational politics and culture further make the appraisal behavior deviate from the formal system. Perhaps, we should reconsider the functions and objectives of performance appraisal for the civil service. |
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