英文摘要 |
In 2003, a provision was introduced to the Trade Secrets Act to criminalize a person who, without authorization, acquires, discloses, or uses a trade secret with an intent to use such the trade secret in foreign jurisdictions, mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau. The intent element was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Criminal Judgment Tai-Sheng No. 111- 3655 as requiring no proof of actual use of a trade secret. This article is intended to review past decisions of the Intellectual Property and Commercial Court to discuss how to determine the intent element. Those decisions can be categorized into two types. Cases of the first type involve proving the intent element by evidence of actual use, while cases of the second type have circumstantial evidence of likelihood of actual use. This paper is intended to draw a lesson from the American judicial practice which adopts the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and to extract some applicable ideas from the U.S. approach to supplement how to determine the intent element with proof of likelihood of actual use. This paper focuses on the interpretation of“use”within the intent element and asserts that“use”of a trade secret does not require actual use. It is sufficient to prove“use”by evidence of“referencing”a trade secret. This is because it is reasonable to infer that when a trade secret has been delivered to, or is likely to be sent to, a competitor, the competitor will either actually use such the information or consider it as a benchmark for research and development or pricing. One example is that a competitor may use such information as a starting point for its try-and-error R&D process. Based on the idea of referencing, a court may find a person guilty when such the person had delivered the stolen trade secret to the owner’s competitor or had wrongfully acquired such the information as he had previously promised such the competitor to assist the competitor’s product or technology development. |