從「常知」進至「真知」證朱子「格物致知」是「反省型態」的實踐工夫

To justify Chu Hsi's “Ko-Chih Kong-fu”: a Reflective-Mode from “Ch'ang-chih ” to “Chen-chih ”

明儒王陽明批評朱子式「格致工夫」是析心與理為二，心理為二之意以現代學術用語表述是：心與理不是「同一」（identical），故心無本有的道德之理（道德判準）。若此，則：（A）「心」沒有本有的道德判準，他唯有透過後天的學習（認知）才有獲得涉及道德的實踐知識的可能性。假設（A）成立，則（B）朱子式格致工夫是以「行動者沒有本有的道德判準/空無道德內涵的（認知）心」為前提的實踐工夫。此條件句蘊含：朱子式格致工夫是「認知型態」的工夫，而此條件句的成立勢必導致朱子的道德理論面臨兩個問題：（1）若「心」僅是空無道德內涵的認知心且無本有的道德判準，則心如何判斷其（在學習中）所認知到的是「道德之理」，而不是其他的非道德或違反道德的東西。（2）行動者可能會因為錯誤的認知，以致無法保證他能夠作出正確的道德判斷與行動。對此二問題，本文試圖論證，（P1）朱子肯定心本有（非自外得）的常知（對道德的通常理解）；（P2）朱子式格致工夫是以「常知」為基本前提的實踐工夫；（P3）行動者須透過道德反省的格致工夫——從「常知」上升至「真知」——以給自己「知行一致」的行動理由。如果（P1）（P2）（P3）皆成立，則我們有理由主張：（C）朱子式的「格致工夫」是「反省型態」的實踐工夫，且沒有這兩個問題。我稱這是「朱子式道德反省論證」。

Wang, Yang-ming (1472-1529), a Neo-Confucian philosopher in the Ming dynasty, criticizes that Chu Hsi's claim of “ko-chih kong-fu” implies that the hsin (mind;心) and li (理)are not identical. Therefore, the hsin in Chu Hsi's moral theory is merely a cognitive subject without immanent standard of moral judgment. If (A): “that the hsin does not possess immanent standard of moral judgment in Chu's theory” withstands, then (B): the fundamental premise of Chu's ko-chih kong-fu lies in that the hisn is merely a cognitive mind. The establishment with this conditional clause not only means that ko-chih kong-fu is a kind of cognitive kong-fu, but also leads to the following questions for Chu's moral theory. (1): how can one decide/confirm that the principles one acquired from one's own empirical experience are actually ‘moral', but not ‘irrelevant to morality' or ‘immoral'?” (2): one's imprecise cognition of morality may cause one to make unsound moral judgment and thus act immorally. To solve these two problems, I argue that (P1): Chu claims that the hisn possesses immanent “ch'ang-chih (the ordinary understanding of morality;常知)” which is not acquired through epistemic learning. (P2): ch'ang-chih is the fundamental premise of Chu's ko-chih kong-fu. (P3): through ko-chih kong-fu, one has to elevate one's ch'ang-chih to chen-chih(真知)to provide oneself justification for action. If (P1), (P2), and (P3) withstand, then the aforementioned two problems no longer exist, and it is reasonable to claim that Chu's ko-chih kong-fu is a reflective mode. I call it the argument of “Chu's moral reflection”.