| 英文摘要 |
The Securities Exchange Act defines the company's insiders as the issuing company's directors, supervisors, managers and the shareholders who holding more than 10% of the total shares. According to previous literature, insiders will sell their own shares in case of financial crisis. The management of the company has the decision-making power of the policy, and at the same time has the information advantage. When the company's performance is not good, it is often covered up with earnings management. The previous literature also pointed out that when an enterprise has the right to choose, it prefers real earnings management over accrued earnings management. This article uses insider trading month data of Taiwan-listed counter companies as asample and is divided into abuying group and aselling group. The results show that when insiders buy stocks, they generate positive abnormal returns, while when insiders sell stocks, they also generate negative abnormal returns. However, regarding the correlation between insider transactions and real earnings management, it was found that insider transactions in the buying group were not significantly related to real earnings management, while insider transactions in the selling group were significantly negatively related to real earnings management. This means that the more serious the company’s actual earnings management situation, the greater the losses that its insiders can avoid by selling shares. |