英文摘要 |
In Interpretation No. 791, the Constitutional Court invalidated the criminalization of adultery, but the issue of compensation for the same conduct was not addressed. Many lawyers believe that this means compensation for adultery is not affected by this Interpretation, referred to as the“no affect”thesis (NAT). However, some district court decisions have rejected claims for compensation and challenged NAT. In this essay, I will examine whether NAT is well-grounded in the Constitution. Upon reviewing the argumentation of this Interpretation, I point out that the main arguments for the Constitutional Court to reject the penalization of adultery follow three steps: (1) reconstructing the meaning and weight of“autonomy of sex”, (2) deciding on heightened scrutiny due to autonomy of sex alone, and (3) weakening the inner link between marriage and the duty of loyalty. All these reasons constitute grounds against penalization as well as obstacles against compensation for adultery. Additionally, the Constitutional Court argues that the penalization may be unconstitutional and unequal because females are more frequently penalized in practice. However, the similar phenomenon also can be seen in the compensation issues: females are more frequently forced to compensate. Thus, the arguments from equality can also be applied to compensation issues. After examining every possible claim right for the compensation, I conclude that NAT is not sound. Even though the Constitutional Court’s decision only deals with the penalization of adultery, the constitutional grounds for compensation must also be affected, and the decisions of those district courts did not violate the main principle of Interpretation No. 791. |