道德欽佩感的價值、疑慮與品德教育啟示──楷模主義的觀點

Values and Problems of Moral Admiration and its Implications for Character and Moral Education: An Exemplarist Perspective

研究目的
見賢思齊與仿效他人是道德學習的重要途徑，但「見賢」要能「思齊」需有好勝心或欽佩感作為情感中介，如何使受教者能對道德楷模心生適當的欽佩之情便很重要。本文旨在論述什麼是道德欽佩感？它有何德育價值，而需予以特別探究？再針對學者對於它的疑慮進行探討與釋疑，尤其是關於道德欽佩感在養成過程中所衍生的問題作探討，最後提出對當前品德教育的啟示。本文將從Zagzebski楷模主義的觀點出發，針對如上問題做出回應。
研究設計／方法／取徑
本文主要採用概念分析、文本詮釋與論證，針對楷模主義最核心的概念與關鍵論述進行分析，再針對論者的相關疑慮進行批判性檢視與回應，最後根據研究結果提出品德教育實務建議。
研究發現或結論
道德欽佩感是對道德楷模的欽佩之情，典型上會激發人心生仿效的意念或／與行動。本文指出，品德教育致力於道德德行陶養，依德而行的動機原已內蘊於德行的習慣養成中，惟鑑於此動機的力道有時而盡，無法將道德認知或情感成功轉化為有德行動，要如何強化道德動機就成為棘手的問題。本文指出，若將品德教育初始在培養個別德行時內含的道德動機視作第一劑，道德欽佩感就如同一道追加劑，有望提升首劑的力道。關於道德欽佩感的「可信度」與「被操弄與灌輸」的疑慮，本文指出Zagzebski提出的「良心的自我反省」包含的兩種具體操作方式，恐無法通過Kotsonis提出的「納粹欽佩希特勒」與「柏格爾犯罪家族」的考驗，反而有鞏固錯誤欽佩之虞。然而，研究者以為Zagzebski有關道德社群語言分工所做的論述有望作為回應，尤其是道德專家具有修正社群有關長久以來公認的道德典範的先見（即表面特徵）的功能。如此將可動態呈現一個持續演進中的道德社群以及對於道德楷模「可欽佩性」的持續修訂。
研究原創性／價值
國內對楷模主義罕有介紹，英、美學界雖有學者提出對楷模主義的疑慮，卻對道德社群語言分工未有應有的關注。本文可為楷模取向品德教育提供實務建議。
教育政策建議或實務意涵
欽佩感固為人與生俱來普遍、內蘊的情感，惟其勢必得參照社群認定的道德典範來學習「誰」是楷模，鑑於社群長期公認的道德典範可能潛存偏差的道德價值，或被有心人士刻意操弄，彰顯道德欽佩感的教育工作刻不容緩。這有賴於將初始欽佩感轉變為反省性欽佩感，透過引導學生反覆練習提問「我為什麼欽佩她／他？」、「我欽佩她／他什麼？」、「她／他真的值得欽佩嗎？」使學習者學習使用「德行識字」這些有關好人的先見，據以判定誰是道德楷模，從中彰顯每個人的品德各殊性，同時思考如何以適合自己的方式展現德行。

Purpose
Emulation is important in approaches to moral learning. Some have argued that emulation and admiration are indispensable emotional mediations through which people who witness moral exemplars are likely to be motivated to emulate them. How individuals come to feel admiration for moral exemplars remains uncertain. This paper explores what moral admiration is and its values in character and moral education. Certain doubts about moral admiration are discussed and dispelled. Among others, certain misgivings about the process of cultivating moral admiration are critically examined. Furthermore, conclusions regarding character and moral education are presented. The thoughts herein are presented from the perspective of Zagzebski’s exemplarism.
Design/methodology/approach
Conceptual analysis, interpretation of texts, and philosophical arguments are employed to address the major concepts and arguments of exemplarism. Certain doubts about moral admiration are critically examined, responded to, and hopefully dispelled. Finally, some practical implications for character and moral education are presented.
Findings/results Moral admiration is admiration specifically felt and expressed for moral exemplars and typically motivates the admirer to emulate the admired. Character education, which is an educational enterprise aimed at the inculcation of moral virtues, develops moral motives if the habituation of moral virtues is successful. Because the moral motivation inherent in moral virtues is frequently lacking enhancing moral motivation is necessary. This paper makes the case that, for inculcating moral motivation, the initial moral motivation inherent in each specific virtue is the first dose, with moral admiration serving as a booster of moral motivation.
This paper describes how the conscientious self-reflection proposed by Zagzebski is problematic because of the doubts and misgivings respectively concerning the trustworthiness of admiration and potential for manipulation and indoctrination; specifically, Zagzebski’s two concrete operationalisations fail the two test cases proposed by Kotnosis, namely those of Nazis admiring Hitler and of the Bogle criminal family. Even worse, conscientious self-reflection as characterised may reinforce misplaced admiration. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that Zagzebski’s discourse on the labour division of the moral linguistic community may serve as a response to that challenge. Among others, moral experts help their moral community to reconsider the prevailing‘stereotype of that’(where that refers to widely acknowledged paradigms of moral exemplars; e.g. good persons are those like‘that’). In so doing, the moral community is depicted as dynamically evolving and one in which the admirability of moral exemplars is under continual reconsideration.
Originality/value
The ethical doctrine of exemplarism is not commonly known in Taiwan. Several Anglo–American academics have expressed misgivings about certain aspects of exemplarism but have not given due attention to the labour division of the moral linguistic community. The findings of this study could provide practical suggestions regarding an exemplarist approach to character education.
Implications for policy/practice
Although the capacity for admiration is innate and universal, learning whom to admire requires a moral community and reference to‘that’. However, because‘that’may be based on biased moral norms or values or may even be manipulated by people with bad intentions, ensuring educated moral admiration is crucial. We must transform‘initial admiration’into‘reflective admiration’by providing learners ample opportunities for practice, such as by asking themselves‘Why do I admire her/him?’;‘Which aspect of her/him do I admire?’; or‘Is she/he really admirable?’By so doing, students may learn to utilise acquired virtue literacy to identify genuine moral exemplars. Each person’s individual moral character is exhibited in the moral exemplars they admire, and each can consider how they wish to exhibit the moral virtues embodied by the exemplar.