因核而生？台灣與南韓的核能開發體制（1960s-1990s）

To Go Nuclear or Not? Nuclear Regimes in Taiwan and South Korea, 1960s-1990s

台灣與南韓的核電開發，從1980年代中期開始，就呈現停滯與擴張兩種相反的趨勢。要解釋這項差異，不能僅從反核運動的強弱著眼，而必須追溯兩國從1960年代以來如何打造出兩種不同的核能開發體制。台灣在兩岸軍力失衡且缺乏安全保證的條件下，將大量人力與經費投入原子彈研發，一方面排擠了核電部門的研究人力與預算，另方面也無法打造核電內需市場帶動技術轉移、產業化與核工系所的擴張。南韓則被納入美國於東北亞的核保護傘，將資源大幅投入民用核能開發與核電機組增建，並修改核電內需市場的進場規則，讓韓國原子力研究院與韓國電力公社為首的開發機構，一方面從外國公司進行技術轉移，另方面再由研究機構的衍生公司來執行設備、燃料製造國產化。南韓核電內需市場的擴張，也創造了數波成立大學核工系所的熱潮，進而造成「應用研究─技術轉移─產業化─人才培育」的循環。

From the mid-1980s, the nuclear expansion projects of Taiwan and South Korea led to diff erent outcomes. This article contends that the root cause for these diff erences can be traced back to the creation of diverging nuclear regimes in the 1960s. Facing a nuclear-armed rival and lacking a security guarantee from the U. S., Taiwan poured manpower and fi nancial resources into its atom bomb project, and yet this did not yield research and development benefi ts to the civilian uses of nuclear energy. Planners and technocrats were unable to foster a domestic market that would incubate indigenous manufacturing and facilitate foreign technology transfer. In contrast, South Korea was under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and devoted the majority of its science and technology resources to civilian nuclear technology. South Korea continuously approved new reactor projects and formed an expanding, yet protected, market to nurture the designated national champion, KEPCO. In order to bid in the stringently regulated market, foreign capital had to promise technology transfers to the state-sponsored research institute (KAERI) and to indigenous manufacturers of nuclear fuel, turbines, and steam supply systems. Once these manufacturers matured, they were all incorporated into KEPCO and became its subsidiaries.