在例外與法治之間：緊急狀態理論思辨與新模式的建構

Between State of Exception and the Rule of Law: A Theoretical Exploration and the Development of a New Model

在這場Covid-19的世紀之疫中，臺灣雖然未如許多國家一般正式宣告緊急狀態，但實際上採取的許多防疫措施仍然相當程度上偏離了常態的法治運作。學界對於這樣的現象雖然已有豐富的討論，但從緊急狀態的理論觀點所進行的深入反思仍較為欠缺。本文因此試圖探討當代主要的幾種緊急狀態理論模式，並嘗試綜整建構出一個新的理論架構，期能作為後續防疫以及其他緊急法制修訂的理論參考。
本文首先回顧二戰前後以Carl Schmitt的獨裁―主權理論和Clinton Rossiter的「憲政獨裁」為代表的緊急狀態理論。接著梳理九一一之後英美憲政理論回應反恐緊急狀態的三種主要取徑，分別以Bruce Ackerman的「緊急憲法」、Oren Gross的「法外措施模式」以及David Dyzenhaus的「法治模式」為代表。而在對於這三種理論進行進一步的批判性分析和比較後，本文嘗試提出一種新的「競合模式」。該模式以實質動態的合憲性判斷、緊急法制的分段接合、權力分立的創新調控、以及常態／緊急狀態的明確區分作為基本原則，嘗試在現行憲法的緊急命令之側勾勒出另一種更符合憲政精神的緊急法制藍圖。這個新模式將逐一回應以下關鍵問題：緊急措施是否皆須合憲、合憲性標準可否調降、調降是否須設界限、可否立法概括授權、總統緊急命令以外的制度選擇、國會與法院的監督機能、例外狀態常態化的挑戰等等。

Facing the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, our government took a distinct approach by abstaining from the direct utilization of presidential emergency decrees. Instead, it anchored its strategies for epidemic prevention and control within the framework of ordinary and special legislation, thereby sidestepping the formal proclamation of a state of emergency, a recourse employed by numerous other nations in recent years. While the constitutionality of these measures spurred vigorous debates among legal scholars, there exists a dearth of profound theoretical reflections. This article aims to fill this void.
Commencing with a concise retrospective analysis of theories of sovereignty and constitutional dictatorship around the World War II, notably elucidated by the contributions of Carl Schmitt and Clinton Rossiter, this article subsequently delves into three distinct theoretical paradigms concerning states of emergency within the context of the ''war against terrorism'' post-September 11. These paradigms encompass the emergency constitution model (as formulated by Bruce Ackerman), the extra-legal measures model (represented by Oren Gross), and the legality model (embodied by David Dyzenhaus). Through a meticulous examination of these models, this article endeavors to construct an innovative framework by synthesizing and comparing their core tenets.
The novel framework is underpinned by four fundamental principles: dynamic and substantive constitutional assessment, expeditious legislative action, the delicate interplay of separations of power, and a clear demarcation between normalcy and emergency. Drawing from these principles, this article addresses pivotal questions pertinent to states of emergency: Is the constitutionality of emergency measures an absolute requirement? Can a more lenient standard of constitutional scrutiny be warranted during emergencies? If so, where should the boundary be drawn? Is an open-ended legislative mandate permissible? Does a presidential emergency decree stand as the exclusive constitutional response to a state of emergency within our legal system? How can parliamentary and judicial oversight be bolstered during emergencies? And how should the challenge posed by the potential normalization of the state of exception be confronted?
By offering comprehensive responses to these inquiries, the novel framework has the potential to provide valuable insights into prevailing epidemic control strategies and to lay the groundwork for reforming existing institutional arrangements.