英文摘要 |
This study analyzed semi-presidential countries with premier-presidential regimes, in which the president does not have the power to dismiss the prime minister but has non-legislative power to appoint the prime minister and dissolve the parliament. This study analyzed the relationships between the president, prime minister and congress and how accountability and checks and balances are implemented for determining the constitutional effects of the president’s exercise of non-legislative power. This study examined four cases of premier-presidential regimes: France, Romania, Finland, and Slovakia. Various non-legislative powers affect the exercise of the presidential decision-making power, regardless of cabinet collapse, government viability, and other factors. This study also explored the operational stability of the premier-presidential regime and discovered that the president having the power to appoint the prime minister does not affect the occurrence of cohabitation. In periods of divided government, the president is involved in the allocation of cabinet personnel; however, the president’s power to dismiss congress is a crucial weapon and can prevent cohabitation. When the non-legislative power of the president is weak, the president can affect congress and other aspects of the government through legislative power. However, this increases the instability of the constitutional government and may detract from the political prestige and power of the president. |