《荀子》中的名、實與類： 一個道德之智與技藝的思考進路

Investigating Names, Reality, and Categories in the Xunzi: An approach from Ethical Wisdom and Skill

荀子對於制名的目的、原則與根據都有深入的分析與說明，他並認為透過分類制名與推類的方式可以「指實」、「上以明貴賤，下以辨同異」，進而通志行道。因此，其對「名」的意義、「名」與「類」的概念形成與使用的看法——尤其他在倫理與政治面向的觀察——非常值得注意。近年學者對荀子的名學研究已累積相當成果，而《荀子》中的「名實問題」——名與實的關係究竟為何？荀子到底應屬於唯名論還是唯實論，「類」是自存還是約定俗成？還是有其他的理解方式？——則是尚在爭議中的問題。要進一步討論這個問題，筆者認為應釐清《荀子》中「名」與「類」是如何發揮其規範功能、「實」又該如何理解。筆者主張，名與實的內涵都是在「道」和掌握「道」的「道德之智」下才得以顯明。因此，要更進一步釐清荀子在名實問題上的看法，我們必須注意到他對「道德之智」、以及與其密切相關的「禮」之理解與強調。
本文將透過《荀子》文本與二手文獻考察，探討荀子對名、實、類的一些重要說法以及學界爭議，並初步釐清荀子可能採取的立場。為了進一步展現道德之智與禮這個討論角度的意義與重要性，本文一方面透過文本討論分析道德之智的特色，以及其與制名、統類、推類等道德判斷能力和深淺層次道德知識之間的關係；另一方面，本文也將透過對信廣來(Shun 1993)與李晨揚(Li 2007) 對仁與禮關係詮釋的檢視，來進一步呈現道德之智（仁知）與禮的關係。本文指出：信、李這兩個詮釋都可被歸類為強調定義與形式規則的「語言性詮釋」，但是考量到《荀子》中禮形塑「類」與「實」所表現出的認知與規範特性，本文所提出強調道德知識之具身性、專一性與情境敏感性的「技藝性詮釋」，將比這類「語言性詮釋」帶來更多資源以理解《荀子》中道德之智的本質，以及禮之實踐在道德知識之形成所扮演的重要性。本文並認為，此一強調智慧與技藝的能力進路，不但有助於讓我們注意到唯名論或唯實論、自存論或約定俗成論這類截然二分不足以表現荀子立場的複雜性，也更能注意到道德轉化在《荀子》道德之智中扮演的重要角色。

Xunzi believes that by categorizing and naming things, as well as analogical projection, one can “point to reality”, “clarify status, and differentiate similarities and differences” to ultimately communicate the sages’ will and exercise Dao. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper examines Xunzi’s important ideas on names, reality, and categories, and addresses scholarly debates, providing initial clarifications on Xunzi’s possible position. Specifically, it argues that the content of “names” and “reality” can only be manifested under the guidance of the ethical wisdom of Dao and ritual. To demonstrate the significance of the approach from ethical wisdom and ritual, this paper analyzes the characteristics of ethical wisdom through textual analysis and its relationship with abilities of ethical judgment such as naming, classification, and categorization, as well as with ethical knowledge at different depths. Additionally, this paper examines the interpretations of the relationship between ren and ritual proposed by Shun (1993) and Li (2007) to further clarify the relationship between ethical wisdom (renzhi) and ritual. I argue that both interpretations by Shun and Li can be grouped as “linguistic interpretations” that focus on definitions and formal rules. However, considering the cognitive and normative characteristics of Xunzi’s ritual, which are manifested in its shaping of “categories” and “reality”, an interpretation focusing on skills that emphasizes the embodiness, specificity, and situational sensitivity of ethical knowledge provides more insights into understanding the nature of ethical wisdom in the Xunzi and of the importance of ritual practice in the formation of moral knowledge. The paper suggests that emphasizing the ability and skill of ethical wisdom helps us to recognize the complex nature of Xunzi’s position, which cannot be expressed in simplistic binaries such as nominalism or realism, or the independent existence of categories or conventionalism. This approach also better brings our attention to the essential role of ethical transformation in Xunzi’s idea of ethical wisdom.