英文摘要 |
This research investigates the endogenous choice of market structure and input pricing strategy by taking into account a vertically-related market where an upstream firm sells an intermediate good to two downstream firms that produce horizontally-differentiated products. For a given vertically-related market with vertical integration, the integrated firm chooses a fixed-fee pricing strategy (a per-unit pricing strategy) when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low (high). For a given vertically-related market with vertical separation, the upstream firm offers input to both downstream firms (one downstream firm) via a fixed-fee pricing strategy when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low (high). When both the market structure and input pricing strategy are endogenously determined, we find when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low that one of the two downstream firms merges with the upstream firm or neither of the downstream firms merge with the upstream firm. When the degree of product substitutability is relatively moderate, neither of the downstream firms merge with the upstream firm. When the degree of product substitutability is relatively high, one of the two downstream firms merges with the upstream firm. |