英文摘要 |
The conventional wisdom holds that managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are Communist cadres whose behavior is governed more by state interests than economic logic. An increasing number of incidents, however, have shown a managerial inclination to protect firms’commercial interests when they clash with state-mandated programs. Drawing on evidence from the state-monopolized industries in China, this study explores the transformation of managerial behavior from being state-driven toward being profit-driven. It argues that as a product of the party-state’s continued emphasis on meritocracy in elite management, SOE managers in China have been transformed into de facto entrepreneurs whose career promotion is linked to their economic performance. SOE managers in possession of commercial knowledge and economic ambition constitute a professional team that is leading Chinese state firms to compete in a globalized market. This new personnel management system in China’s SOE sector also reflects the adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party in pursuing pro-market reform. |