中國大陸地方政府行為的制度基礎：回顧與評述

The Institutional Foundations of China’s Local Government Behavior: A Literature Review

本文回顧中國大陸地方政府行為誘因機制（incentive mechanism）的重要文獻，以及相關的爭論和批判。根據論者強調的主題，這些文獻主要分為三類：市場保全型聯邦主義理論、政治競賽理論，以及財政收入極大化理論。市場保全型聯邦主義嘗試為中國轉型建構分析框架，但因預測與現實間諸多不符引發批評。政治競賽模型強調官僚體系對地方政府官員行為的影響，然在理論的完備性及實證的表現上，近來遭受質疑。財政收入極大化模型認為，從地方政府追求財政收入的角度即可充分解釋轉型時期地方政府的行為。其立論固然簡明，但尚待進一步實證檢定之確認。

This paper reviews the literature in the field of political economy with regard to the incentive mechanism underlying the behavior of local governments in China, its arguments, and the critiques involved. There are three theories to be investigated sequentially, namely market-preserving fiscal federalism, political tournament theory, as well as fiscal revenue maximization model. Market-preserving fiscal federalism has been adopted as a basic framework to study the political-economic issues in China during its transitional period. It has been criticized for its failure in the submission of empirically supportive evidence. Political tournament theory stresses the influence of the CCP’s bureaucratic system on the behavior of local officials. It seems to be widely accepted among scholars due to relevant concepts. However, the lack of completeness in both theoretical definition and empirical evidence is severely criticized. The fiscal revenue maximization model keeps its assumption as simple and straightforward as its name implies. But its theoretical validity is still subject to further empirical findings in the future.