E. Levinas「為他」倫理學及其德育蘊義

E. Levinas' Ethics of Responsibility-for-the-Other and Its Implications for Moral Education

西方倫理學一向著重於道德行動主體方面的研究，探討道德主體為什麼決定做出善的行動，以及如何決定什麼是善的行動。然而相對忽略了道德歷程中的另一因素──道德承受者。針對這樣的問題，西方在二十世紀興起了以道德承受者為研究核心的新倫理學。就此課題，Levinas「為他」倫理學具有重要貢獻。Levinas認為西方哲學一直有壓抑「他者」的傾向，其思想轉而以「為他」為核心。在人的生存型態的選擇上，他強調要走出自我持存的錮閉，而面向無限豐盈的他者世界。在倫理方面，Levinas認為應自「遵從自我的理性判斷或命令」，轉為遵從「他者面容的命令」或「為他負責的義務」。Levinas「為他倫理學」對道德教育甚具意義，有助開展不同於以往的道德實踐途徑。本文首先闡明Levinas「為他」倫理學之梗概。其次，討論其學說對於倫理學發展的重要意義。最後，討論其學理在實踐上可能遭遇的問題，以及在落實於道德教育時應著重哪些要點。

Most traditional western ethical theories emphasize the subjects of moral acts， in the meantime failing to consider the other side (the other person or object) of such acts. Traditional theories focus on the question of why moral subjects decide to perform or not perform certain moral acts， and how to judge what are morally “good” (“right，” “just”) actions. Thus the objects or “receivers” of moral actions have no place in these theories. In contrast， more recent (and “postmodern”) ethical theories in the west tend to focus on the “other” person， the recipient of a moral act， the one for the sake of whom it is performed. Among these new ethical thinkers， the French-Lithuanian philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has had a far-reaching influence. Levinas thinks that western philosophy has consistently suppressed “the other”; he takes the “for-the-other” as the core of his philosophy. He suggests that the traditional western idea of oneself as the essential “being” leads to intolerance; rather， we need to think first of the other (not the self)， take responsibility for the other. Our responsibility for the other is our unavoidable duty. Levinas’ new approach to ethics has significant implications for moral education. The purpose of this paper is to explicate the ethical thought of Levinas， to discuss the significance and limits of his theory， and to elucidate its implications for education.