論「道德的形上學」：牟宗三與勞思光宋明儒學詮釋之分歧

On Moral Metaphysics: The Debate Between Mou Zongsan and Lao Siguang

本文目的在釐清：牟宗三視宋明儒學為一種「道德的形上學」是否恰當？「道德的形上學」特色為嫁接道德與存在，形上學與倫理學。牟氏強調陸王心學亦屬「道德的形上學」，勞思光則否定「道德的形上學」之解釋效力，並認為陸王心性論只處理道德問題，不對「價值」做「存有論意義之解釋」。質言之，貫通道德與存在合乎良知「生天生地，成鬼成帝」之界定。牟氏採取「形上解讀」，對「生生」等概念之詮釋符合相關文本脈絡，並可避免勞氏「實然解讀」引發的決定論以及生與生之破壞兩理論問題。基於以上理由，以「道德的形上學」表述宋明儒學之特色可行。但勞思光點出「道德的形上學」隱含「天道」無實有性之空名問題，亦有其理論貢獻。

Mou Zongsan regards Confucianism, particularly Song-Ming Neo- Confucianism, as a type of moral metaphysics, which bridges the gap between morality and being, metaphysics and ethics. According to Mou, Lu-Wang School is categorized as moral metaphysics as well. In contrast, Lao Siguang has an issue with this characterization on grounds that Lu-Wang School deals only with morality without engaging in an ontological interpretation of value. Moral metaphysics fits with Wang Yangming’s theory of liangzhi in that liangzhi is defined as the metaphysical principle giving rise to all existing things. Lao adopts a de facto interpretation of tian-dao, tian-li, and sheng-sheng, so that the two theoretical problems, determinism and the coexistence of life and death, inevitably ensue. From an anthropocosmic perspective, Mou takes tian-dao, tian-li, and sheng-sheng as elements of metaphysical theorizing, and therefore the two sticklers proposed by Lao no longer exist. For the above reasons, depicting Confucianism as moral metaphysics can be justified. Nevertheless, Lao’s opposing viewpoint is also credited with unearthing the implicit issue of transforming tian-dao into an empty concept in Mou’s articulation of moral metaphysics.