高階經理人酬金對避險性衍生性商品使用的影響

Executive Compensation and Corporate Hedging with Derivatives

本文探討高階經理人酬金與激勵性質員工紅利對企業避險衍生性商品使用的影響。本文以2016年至2019年符合證基會公司治理評鑑標準之上市櫃公司為樣本。實證結果顯示，總經理、副總經理酬金對企業避險衍生性商品使用有顯著正向影響，代表高階經理人酬金越高，有助於企業使用避險衍生性商品。但高階經理人現金紅利與股票紅利對企業避險衍生性商品使用則無影響。此外，家族企業高階經理人酬金對企業避險衍生性商品使用有顯著負向影響，存在剝奪效果。

This study examines the effect of executive compensation on corporate hedging with derivatives. The sample is from the Corporate Governance Evaluation of Securities and Futures Institute from 2016 to 2019 in Taiwanese public-listed firms. The results from the logistic regression find that executive compensation affects corporate hedging with derivatives significantly. The result represents that the higher executive compensation can improve companies to use hedging derivatives. However, the impacts of cash bonus and stock bonus on the derivatives using of corporate hedging are insignificantly. Furthermore, the CEO executive compensation in family business has a significant negative impact on the derivatives using of corporate hedging.