灌輸、情緒主義與道德教育

Indoctrination, Emotivism and Moral Education

灌輸這一議題對所有關心教育的人而言，是一長久不斷的討論主題。但是，教育哲學家對於教育與灌輸之間的關係究竟為何卻鮮有一致的看法。本文寫作的主要動機之一即在釐清灌輸這個概念，其二則是說明道德教育的領域中灌輸可能發生的可能理論基礎。首先，本文對於灌輸一詞的概念分析將由邏輯地解析灌輸的適用規準來著手，分別從方法、內容、目的和結果等四方面來區分灌輸與教育兩者之間的關係。並從上述的概念分析中，得出目的規準在邏輯上較其他可能的規準更能說明灌輸的概念，即目的規準可作為灌輸的充分必要條件。最後，本文試圖從後設倫理學說中情緒主義的倫理主張在德育教學上的特殊意含，描繪出導致灌輸或道德灌輸的理論背景，並證立目的的這一規準較足以區別出道德灌輸本身的不適當性。

The issue of indoctrination has proved to be a topic of perennial interest to all concerned with education. However， there is very little agreement among philosophers of education about the relationship between education and indoctrination. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the questions as follows: What is exactly meant by indoctrination? Or， what is the criterion of indoctrination? Does it refer to the method， the content， the aim or intention， the consequence， or the combination of some of these candidates? These questions will be examined and analyzed， in order to make clear the concept of indoctrination. Considering the preceding arguments， it appears that the aim or intention criterion is more appropriate than the others in distinguishing indoctrination from education. And the aim criterion is particularly helpful in dealing with children’s moral education. In the end， it will be suggested that Stevenson’s Emotivism supplies an important clue for our understanding of this controversial issue. For if indoctrinating someone is trying to get him/her to believe a moral judgment is right， or a moral attitude， the study of Stevenson’s Emotivism may make it clear where the theoretical grounds of indoctrination are.