市場短視與經理人迎合動機：企業策略所扮演的角色

Market Myopia and Managerial Catering Incentive: The Role of Business Strategy

本文以企業策略的角度分析公司經理人是否會為了迎合市場短視投資人而改變財務決策，並進一步分析是否會影響公司市場績效。公司策略以Miles and Snow (2003)提出的理論架構為基礎，將公司分為進取者、分析者及防禦者。本文的主要研究結果如下：第一，公司會提高盈餘管理程度與降低研發支出迎合短視的市場投資人。第二，若納入企業策略的角度來看，相對其他策略類型的公司，分析者較會因市場短視而提高盈餘管理程度與降低研發支出。第三，沒有短視的投資人不喜歡公司盈餘管理，尤其對於進取者而言更為明顯。另一方面，分析者迎合市場短視投資人的偏好會得到市場顯著的正向回應，然而長期之下市場績效會開始反轉，分析者將無法繼續以盈餘管理的方式迎合短視投資人而藉以牟利。

This paper analyzes whether corporate managers change their financial decisions to cater to myopic investors from the perspective of corporate strategy and whether this affects the market performance of the company. Corporate strategy is based on the theoretical framework proposed by Miles and Snow (2003), which classifies companies as prospectors, analysts, and defenders. The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, companies will increase the degree of earnings management and reduce R&D expenditures to cater to myopic investors. Second, if we include corporate strategy in our perspective, analysts are more likely than the other strategy types to increase the degree of earnings management and reduce R&D expenditures due to the myopic investors. Third, no myopic investors do not like earnings management; the phenomenon is especially noticeable for prospectors. On the other hand, the preference of analysts to cater to myopic investors will attract a significant positive response from the market, but in the long run market performance will start to reverse and analysts will not be able to keep profiting from managing earnings with myopic investors in mind.