續擴窘境下的團隊資本預算決策──預算強調與資訊不對稱對團隊極端化的影響

THE CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISION OF A GROUP IN A DILEMMA OF ESCALATION - THE IMPACT OF BUDGETARY EMPHASIS AND INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY ON THE GROUP POLARIZATION

本研究探討決策小組面對續擴窘境時，是否有極端化的續擴行為？以及預算強調與資訊不對稱對團隊極端化續擴行為的調節效果。本研究證實預算強調與資訊不對稱對不同的決策單位有不同的影響力。研究結果發現，不考量預算強調與資訊不對稱等調節變數的情況下，團隊並未有顯著的極端化續擴決策。當存在資訊不對稱的情況下，個別決策者有顯著的續擴行為，但團隊卻沒有顯著極端化續擴決策。當預算強調與資訊不對稱同時存在下，團隊出現極端化續擴決策；顯示團隊極端化續擴決策受到資訊不對稱與預算強調所調節。

This study was designed to test whether the decision group would escalate more commitment than individual managers do when they confront with a dilemma of escalation. Furthermore, this study examined the moderated effect of the budgetary emphasis and informational asymmetry on the level of group polarization. The laboratory-based experiment found that the impacts of budgetary emphasis and informational asymmetry on different decision units are different. Without considering the effect of budgetary emphasis and informational asymmetry, there is no significant group polarization. When combining self-justification with information asymmetry, individual managers could create significant escalation of commitment, while the decision groups did not. When combining budgetary emphasis with information asymmetry, both individual managers and decision groups create significant escalation of commitment, while decision groups create more escalation than individual managers do, suggesting group-polarized escalation. In other words, the group decision makers would make polarized decision under the condition of budgetary emphasis and information asymmetry.