實踐知識傾向論與其困難

Dispositional Accounts of Knowledge-how and their Difficulties

在實踐知識的研究中，不論是智識主義者或反智識主義者，許多學者都藉由傾向來說明實踐知識的模態面向。而在當今的傾向研究中，學界已普遍同意傾向可以被介入也可以被遮蓋。因此，如果我們要用傾向來說明實踐知識，一個方法論上的重要問題就會隨之而來：實踐知識是否如同傾向一樣，也可以被介入或被遮蓋？文獻上，霍利 (Hawley 2003) 透過論證「實踐知識不會被介入」來顯示出實踐知識與傾向在模態面向上的不同，並以此反對實踐知識傾向論。而康斯坦汀 (Constantin 2018) 與哈爾杰 (Khalaj 2019) 則是先反駁了霍利的論證，然後嘗試說明傾向論的理論解釋力，以此來辯護傾向論。本文將先回顧實踐知識傾向論的發展，然後進一步分析霍利、康斯坦汀與哈爾杰之間的論戰，並以此論證：實踐知識傾向論面臨方法論上的困難，因而並不令人滿意。

Many epistemologists, including both intellectualists and anti-intellectualists, try to explain the modal aspects of knowledge-how in terms of dispositions. And according to recent research on dispositions, it is generally accepted that dispositions can be masked or finked. Naturally, scholars who want to defend a dispositional account of knowledge-how (DAK) have to answer a fundamental methodological question: can knowledge-how, just like dispositions, be masked or finked? In order to show that there are some modal differences between knowledge-how and dispositions, Hawley (2003) argues that knowledge-how cannot be masked or finked, and therefore DAK is hopeless. However, Constantin (2018) and Khalaj (2019) argue that Hawley’s anti-DAK argument is problematic, and further defend DAK by appealing to its explanatory power. In this paper, I firstly survey the development of DAK and the debates between Hawley, Constantin and Khalaj. Building on that survey, I argue that DAK has some methodological defects and hence is not satisfactory.