經理人調節焦點與會計穩健性

Manager Regulatory Focus and Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

受先前研究管理者特質對公司政策和策略影響的研究的啟發，本研究討論經理人調節焦點與會計穩健性之間的關係，以盈餘反映市場壞消息比好消息更即時的不對稱來衡量會計穩健。根據調節焦點理論(Crowe and Higgins 1997)，經理人有促進焦點(promotion focus)更願意冒險尋求成就，而經理人有預防焦點(prevention focus)較保守，傾向避免錯誤。我們使用Basu (1997) 模型和C_Score (Khan and Watts 2009) 衡量會計穩健，並檢驗預防焦點(prevention focus)的經理人是否比促進焦點(promotion focus)的經理人。我們發現經理人有預防焦點(prevention focus)與會計穩健性呈現正相關，這表明這些經理人相較其他經理人風險趨避者，也更傾向於保守。

Motivated by prior studies that examine the effect of managerial attributes on corporate policies and strategies, this study examines the relationship between CEOs’ regulatory focus and accounting conservatism as measured by asymmetric timeliness of earnings. According to regulatory focus theory (Crowe and Higgins 1997), people with promotion focus are more willing to take risks to seek achievement, whereas people with prevention focus are more conservative to avoid mistakes. We measure accounting conservatism using Basu’s (1997) model and C_Score (Khan and Watts 2009) and examine whether CEOs with the prevention focus are more conservative than CEOs with the promotion focus. We find that CEO’s prevention focus is positively associated with accounting conservatism, suggesting that CEOs with prevention focus are more risk-averse and have a higher tendency to be conservative than the other CEOs.