英文摘要 |
This thesis is to explore the "Knowing Possession" versus "Use" debateon insider trading prohibition under Securities Exchange Law, focusing on:does the plaintiff need to demonstrate the causal connection between thematerial nonpublic information and the defendants' trading? Commentatorssupporting "Knowing Possession" standard claim that the plaintiff need notprove that the defendants purchased or sold securities because of thematerial nonpublic information that they knowingly possessed. It issufficient if the plaintiff proves that the defendants purchased or soldsecurities while knowingly in possession of the material nonpublicinformation. However, Commentators supporting "Use" standard deem thatthe plaintiff must, at a minimum, prove that the suspect used the informationin formulating or consummating his trade. In United State, this debateoriginated from a circuit split among federal courts as to insider trading’s"Scienter" requirement. In order to settle the dispute, SEC promulgated Rule10b5-1 in 2000, imposing liability when a person is "aware" of the materialnonpublic information when they participate in a securities trade.Nevertheless, U. S. courts and commentators still doubt whether "aware"standard really resolve the problem. In Taiwan, article 157-1, Paragraph 1 ofthe Securities and Exchange Law imposes liability when a person is learningabout the material nonpublic information when they trade. Even so, the reasons of amendment to that article in 1988 revealed that insider trading issomeone "using" the material nonpublic information to trade. The splitopinions showed that there is "Knowing Possession" versus "Use" debate inTaiwan since 1988.The author discusses the debate in Taiwan, and advocates possiblesolutions to the dilemma in this thesis. The scheme of this thesis comprisessix chapters as follows:Chapter I illustrates the motives, methods and realm of this thesis.Chapter II explores the theoretical underpinnings of insider tradingregulation. First of all, the author illustrates several theories in U.S., andthen explores the theoretical underpinnings of insider trading regulation inTaiwan. In the end, the author stands for the Information Property Theory,and advocates that the insider trading prohibition is more easily justified as ameans of protecting property rights in information than as a way ofprotecting investors. And that property right is assigned to corporationpaying to produce information. The rationale for assigning the property rightto the firm is precisely the same as the rationale for prohibiting patentinfringement or theft of trade secrets: protecting the economic incentive toproduce socially valuable information.Chapter III illustrates the "Knowing Possession" versus "Use" debateon insider trading prohibition in U.S. before 2000. The federal judicialdecisions in three recent cases frame the debate. The Second Circuit inUnited States v. Teicher stated in dicta that possession of material nonpublicinformation was the correct standard for courts to use in cases of insidertrading. In SEC v. Adler and United States v. Smith, the Eleventh and NinthCircuits, respectively, found that actual use of nonpublic information wasnecessary to find that an insider trading violation occurred.Chapter IV explores the recent situation of the debate in U.S. The SECpromulgated Rule 10b5-1 in 2000 to resolve the circuit split between thepossession or use standards in cases of insider trading. Although debate existed over whether or not the SEC should offer a formal definition, theSEC determined that the time had come to provide a definition andcontended that "aware" standard including several affirmative defenses bestsatisfy the goals of insider trading laws to protect investors and the market.However, most U.S. courts and some commentators don’t agree with SECon "aware" standard, and still support "Knowing Possession" or "Use"standard. In sum, this debate exists in U.S. until now.Chapter V illustrates the "Knowing Possession" versus "Use" debate oninsider trading prohibition in Taiwan. As we know, article 157-1, Paragraph1 of the Securities and Exchange Law imposes liability when a person islearning about the material nonpublic information when they trade. However,the reasons of amendment to that article in 1988 revealed that insider tradingis someone "using" the material nonpublic information to trade. The splitopinions showed that there is "Knowing Possession" versus "Use" debate inTaiwan. After carefully studying major opinions made by courts andcommentators, the author uses the former analysis of Chapter II ~ IV todiscuss the debate in several aspects, including the theoretical underpinningsof insider trading regulation, Principles of Proportionality, Principles of theClearness, and Subjective Constitutive Requirement and its proof. Finally,this thesis argues, for a violation of insider trading regulation, the plaintiffmust, at a minimum, prove that: (1) there is a causal connection between thematerial nonpublic information and the defendants' trading; (2) no matterhaving any intention or not, the defendants should willfully violate insidertrading regulation.Chapter VI reviews all discussions in this thesis. The author advocates two possible solutions to the dilemma. |