董事及高階管理者超額薪酬，對員工薪酬之影響︰執行長權力調節效果之探討

The Impact of Excess Director and Top Manager Compensation on Employee Pay: The Moderating Effect of CEO Power

高階管理者與員工薪酬關係為各界關心之議題，而許多研究以相對薪酬比值探討垂直薪酬公平性，忽略高階管理者對企業貢獻差異。為了改善此衡量問題，本研究引入超額薪酬概念，探討董事及高階管理者超額薪與員工薪酬之關聯性。此外，由於執行長為企業核心人物，其如何運用權力為文獻關心之議題，因此本研究延伸探討執行長權力對員工薪酬政策之影響。實證結果顯示，高階管理者超額薪酬對員工薪酬具有正向影響，表示員工薪酬對高階管理者超額薪酬有敏感度。執行長結構權力對員工薪酬呈負向影響，顯示執行長結構權力對員工薪酬成長有抑制作用，呼應議價理論觀點。本研究也發現，CEO權力對‘高階管理者超額薪酬與員工薪酬關係’以及‘董事超額薪酬與員工薪酬關係’有相反方向之調節效果。

Pay fairness between top managers and employees has long been of major concern to the public; however, past studies ignore top managers' differing contribution to their firms when addressing cross-company pay fairness by using CEO pay ratios. To resolve this issue, we introduce the concept of excess compensation into this domain and explore the impact of excess director and top manager compensation on employee pay. To help gain insight into how the CEO exerts power on company policies, we extend to explore the impact of CEO power on employee pay policies. Our findings indicate that excess top manager compensation is positively associated with employee pay, suggesting that employee pay is sensitive to excess top manager compensation. CEO structural power significantly and negatively affects employee pay, which implies that CEO structural power poses a threat to employee pay raises. This study also demonstrates that CEO power serves as an opposite moderator between excess director compensation and employee pay and between excess top manager compensation and employee pay.