從兩種自律義看牟宗三的康德學詮釋：內在自律（IA）或外在自律（EA）

On Mou Zongsan's Interpretation of Kant's Moral Philosophy from the Perspective of Two Kinds of Autonomy

本文結合「自律與他律」和「內在論與外在論」構成AHIE，目的在解決僅從自律與他律來詮釋、定位道德理論的侷限性。以牟宗三詮釋下的康德學及同屬自律的陽明學為例，若進一步衡諸道德實踐中判斷與動力的來源及其關係，前者因二者異源，據不同詮釋立場可有IA或EA之分；後者則基於肯定二者共源於良知而屬於IA。然而，EA恐因判斷與動力的異源被判定是他律，而為一矛盾概念。關於這詮釋差異與衍生的問題，筆者在探討康德學的「道德實踐的動力發生程序」及相關議題後會見出：EA沒有矛盾。此表面的矛盾可由完全的與不完全的自律倫理學之區分而化解。

This paper integrates the two sets of distinction of autonomy(A) and heteronomy(H), internalism(I) and externalism(E) into four different groups (AHIE) in order to expand the comprehension and categorization of a moral theory beyond the limitation of autonomy and heteronomy. Taking moral judgement and motivating force into consideration, it shows the differences between Kant's and Wang Yang-Ming's moral theories, though both are autonomy theories based on Mou Zongsan's interpretation. With different sources of moral judgment and motivating force the former could be categorized into Internalism-Autonomy(IA) or Externalism-Autonomy(EA) according to different interpretations. The latter is classified as IA because both moral judgment and motivating force come from liang-chi (moral heart-mind). However, EA might be contradictory since moral judgment and motivating force coming from different sources may lead to heteronomy. Through investigating Kant's ''procedure of motivating force in moral practice'' and its related issues, I show that EA is not contradictory. The seemingly contraction could be solved by the division of autonomy into complete and incomplete ones.