家族企業與公司治理──控制權安排與法律風險

Family Firms and Corporate Governance: Control-Enhancing Mechanisms and Accountability

家族企業對於各國經濟發展均有重要影響。在亞洲，約85 %的公司為受家族控制之企業，占總體市值約32 %；而在台灣，家族企業占上市櫃公司家數近七成。世界各國的家族企業多半採用各類強化控制權措施，以達到確保財富傳承與維繫家族聲譽之目的。家族中的核心管理成員可能任職於公司，也可能未任職公司而是透過其他方式控制或影響公司。在法人格獨立、股東有限責任等現代公司法基本運作原則下，要對於實際上控制公司的人進行責任之訴追有其現實上與法律架構下之困難。家族控制公司，享有因控制所生之利益，但權責不相符、究責不易，也是家族企業治理中的一大障礙。本文以研究家族控制的上市櫃公司之控制權安排與責任訴追為核心，嘗試梳理國內外家族企業可能採行的強化控制權方式，探討我國現行法與司法實務下的責任歸屬，並進一步分析目前的規範對於家族企業之治理影響為何。

"Family firms play a significant role in national economic worldwide, accounting e.g. for 85 % of all enterprises in the Asia-Pacific countries and nearly 70 % of listed companies in Taiwan. In general practice, the founder families exert control or influence by appointing their representatives as directors or employ control-enhancing mechanisms such as cross-holding, pyramidal ownership, voting agreement, etc. Under the doctrine of limited liability and corporate personality, courts have disregarded the doctrine and held the shareholders or directors accountable for their decisions in the running of companies only in some exceptional circumstances. This paper analyzes control-enhancing mechanisms and accountability in the context of family firms and proposes an amendment of law for a more transparency and accountability framework of family firms."