| 中文摘要 |
"佛羅里達州檢方指出本院先例曾裁決探員的行為是否構成美國憲法增修條文第四條所規定之「搜索」，與探員的主觀意圖無關。但這些案例僅裁決探員客觀合理的攔下或搜索被告，不會因為探員決定攔下或搜索之真正理由而失去效力。所以，超速駕駛的被告無法抱怨他被警察攔下來的真正理由是種族騷擾。然而在本案，本院需要解釋的問題正是探員的行為是否構成客觀合理的搜索。如本院所述，探員的行為是否構成客觀合理的搜索取決於探員是否有住所居住者的默示許可進入前廊，而這又取決於探員進入住所前廊的目的。在本案，探員們的行為客觀顯露探員們進入Jardines住所前廊的目的是為了進行搜索，而沒有人會認為Jardines默示許可探員們以此目的進入住所前廊。The State points to our decisions holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. But those cases merely hold that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant will not be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer's real reason for the stop was racial harassment. Here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do." |
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