英文摘要 |
Changes in Taiwan’s corporate laws and securities exchange laws are relatively limited in the year of 2020 in terms of legislation. The main change concerns the representative suits and director/supervisor dismissal suits brought by protection institutions under the Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act (the “Investor Protection Act”). In contrast, developments in terms of court decisions and administrative interpretations are plenty, which pose impact on the relative power and responsibility between shareholders vis-à-vis directors under Taiwan’s corporate governance laws. In this paper, I firstly comment on the amendments to the Securities Exchange Act and the Investor Protection Act. I then comment on the ruling of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Grand Chamber regarding the criminal offense of non-arms-length transaction under the Securities Exchange Act. Following the above, I use two inconsistent interpretations made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (“MOEA”) regarding the limits of charter freedom, and the latest Supreme Court decision on voting agreements between shareholders and between directors, to illustrate the conservative attitude of Taiwan’s practice against expanding the shareholder’s power. As a comparison, I use the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the right to information of directors and regarding the business judgment rule as applied to the criminal offense of breach of faith to illustrate the relative trust in directors in Taiwan’s practice. Finally, I use the corporate fight incidents of Tatung Co., particularly the case involving the deletion of directorate candidates nominated by shareholders and the MOEA’s expansive interpretation of the conditions for shareholders to convene shareholders’ meeting, as a case study to illustrate the unresolved issue of the relative power between shareholders and directors under Taiwan’s corporate laws. Overall, the development of corporate laws and securities exchange laws in practice in the year of 2020 provides us many materials to reflect on the relative relationship between shareholders and directors. |