董監事責任保險與董事會忙碌性

DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY INSURANCE AND BOARD BUSYNESS

本研究根據2008至2018年間台灣上市上櫃非金融產業共1,532家公司的資料，檢驗董監事責任險（directors’ and officers’ liability insurance）的保障如何影響公司董事會的忙碌性（busyness）。既有研究指出公司為其董監事及重要職員投保責任保險雖然有助於優秀董監事與管理階層的聘任與留任、促進任職者承擔適當風險並強化公司與人員面對訴訟時的財務保障，但董監事責任險亦有可能使受保障者產生道德危險與投機行為，例如引發董監事輕忽其職責從而在本公司之外的機構兼任更多職務而形成較高的董事會忙碌程度。實證結果顯示，在考慮控制董事人力資源素質以及公司相關特性與治理條件下，董監事責任險保障程度與董事會忙碌性呈現顯著正向關係，董監事責任險涵蓋程度越高，董事兼任職務數愈多即董事會忙碌程度越高，支持董監事任險引發董事輕忽職責進而兼任較多職務的道德危險觀點。

This study examines how providing directors with directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (DOLI) affects the busyness of a firm’s board of directors, using data from 1,532 non-financial firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and the Taipei Exchange (TPEx) from 2008 to 2018. Providing DOLI may help recruitment and retention of directors and management and strengthen financial protection of firms and individuals when facing litigation. Providing DOLI, however, might lead to moral hazard problems and opportunistic behaviors, such as causing directors to neglect their duties and hold more positions in other institutions, resulting in a higher degree of board busyness. Empirically, after controlling for the quality of the directors and governance of the firms, a significant positive relationship exists between DOLI and board busyness, confirming the moral hazard problem.