試論刑案釋憲溯及效力：從憲訴到非常上訴

Retroactive Effects of Constitutional Interpretation in Criminal Cases

相對於其他憲法解釋效力有關問題，諸如定期失效，釋憲效力溯及議題於我國法相對上是受到忽略者，令人遺憾地，這樣之情況繼續存在於憲法訴訟法中。就刑事案件釋憲效力溯及之問題言，至少有三項值得提出討論。首先，憲訴法最大特色，是將釋憲效力對所有刑事確定案件全面溯及，然此一看似有利被告之規定，除僅部分歐陸國家所採外，更忽視歐陸各國釋憲溯及效力法制本身之體系建構，且忽略比較法上尚有美國法實體與程序規範區分之折衷模式，故有檢討必要。其次，就未決案件之釋憲溯及問題言，因憲訴法在釋憲一般效力仍採向未來發生為原則，也就是不溯及既往，但卻又規定新釋憲結果僅及於已繫屬法院之案件，造成部分刑事偵查中案件無法受惠，故產生不公平救濟問題，且是越接近新釋憲結果之案發事實，反不能立即受到救濟。最後，於釋憲效力對刑事確定裁判全面溯及之後，固然得減少此類案件不公平救濟問題，但在案件量遽增後，除造成有限司法資源排擠效應外，更進而凸顯於我國現行法下，違憲與違法救濟本質之不同，從而必須從擴張釋憲溯及門檻做起，進而對刑事非常上訴管轄法院及其權限、開啟方式與規範分類等制度設計，予以一併變革，以實踐對於確定裁判之救濟。

The challenging issues of temporal effects of constitutional interpretation in Taiwan have been neglected ever since it was appeared in the caseload of the Grand Justices in the early 1980s. Very regrettably, this situation will continue to exist in the newly enacted Constitutional Court Procedure Act. There are at least three problems with the system of the temporal effects brought out by this Act. Firstly, the Article 53 II, which makes a 180-degree turn and entitles any defendant with the right to reopen a final criminal judgment according to a new constitutional interpretation, ignoring the reality that there is no consensus regarding the issues of retroactivity of laws. In particular, it fails to understand that any approach of the temporal effects has its own merits and demerits. Furthermore, this regulation also fails to understand that there is a third choice of the system of temporal effects of constitutional interpretation, i.e.: the US system of retroactivity of laws. Secondly, through Article 53 I, which maintains the principle of non-retroactivity, with Article 52 I and Article 53 II, the newly enacted Constitutional Procedure Act establishes a unique but bizarre system in terms of comparative law. This system not only produces the outcome of inequity among pending cases but also makes the situation of some pending cases, those in the investigation phase, worse than the final judgements. What's worse, this situation will continue to exist after the enactment of the new law. Thirdly, most importantly, besides expanding the scope of retroactivity, to consolidate the fruits of expanding retroactive application of new rules, we are required to modify the current post-conviction procedure in Taiwan. This is simply because the new Article 53 II of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act would not only increase the caseload for seeking the post-conviction reliefs but add huge burdens to the system of the post-conviction review. Therefore, we will need a new system of post-conviction procedure in Taiwan.