英文摘要 |
The purpose of combination regulation, according to the hypothesis of Structure School, fundamentally is to keep the aggravation of market structure, and the potentially accompanied abuse of monopoly power and collusion off in advance. The judgments of Taiwanese Fair Trade Act (FTA) upon enterprises combinations are on the basis of the intensities of two considerations – the overall economic advantages and the competition restrain disadvantages. However, the inclusions of the two measures are invariably ambiguous that indeed results in numerous subjective adjudications in practice. Setting out from the motivation of combination, this study analysis the reason that individual firm prefers the strategy of external growth – combination to others in the first place. The presumable confusion and difficulty in the means of combination regulation – preventing ex post behaviors by using ex ante regulation are then proposed. Subsequently, an economic theoretical model is constructed to explore the overall economic advantages -- cost saving, and the competition restrains disadvantages – loss to allocation efficiency, accompanied by the occurrence of combination in the specific industry. Despite that the economic analysis can provide an objective basis for judging the appropriateness of combination, there still remains obstacle to implement operationally. By virtue of referring the experience of western country, particularly the merger regulation in US, it is revealed that the key point is back to the variation of market structure after the behavior of combination. Fortunately, after a series of experiment of Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission (FTC) more than ten years, the way to the market structure regulation is also gradually became aware of. Accordingly, referring to the experience in western country, the similar regulation divided the combination regulation into simplified and general operational procedures can be instituted. But, to a certain extent the further refinements of some criteria are still needed. |