外部董事權益薪酬與公司避稅之關聯性

Equity-based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Tax Avoidance

本研究旨在探討美國公司外部董事之權益薪酬誘因對於公司避稅行為之影響。考量權益薪酬的內生性問題，本研究採用工具變數二階段最小平方法來進行實證分析；研究結果顯示，給予外部董事較高權益薪酬的公司，其長期有效稅率較低，亦即權益薪酬比重與公司避稅程度存在正向關係。另外本研究亦發現，在經營策略型態較偏向防禦型策略的公司、以及資金受限程度較高的公司，外部董事權益薪酬對公司避稅程度之影響會較為顯著。本研究之結果說明權益薪酬可提供外部董事較高的誘因監督公司績效，促使公司管理者進行長期稅務規劃以增加股東財富。

This study examines whether outside directors’ equity-based compensation is associated with a firm’s tax avoidance. Using an instrumental variable approach that mitigates the endogeneity concern of director equity incentives, we find that firms paying a higher fraction of their outside director compensation in the form of equity have lower long-run effective tax rates. In addition, the positive effect of outside director equity incentives on tax avoidance is more pronounced in firms adopting a defender-type business strategy and in firms that are more financially constrained. Overall, the findings collectively suggest that equity-based compensation helps motivate outside directors to provide better advising and monitoring so that managers engage in more tax avoidance to maximize shareholder wealth.