中國早期中觀哲學的存有論與倫理踅轉

The Ontology and Ethical Shift of Early Mādhyamaka Philosophy in China

本文旨於探究中國早期中觀哲學的存有論，並論證從其存有論導出倫理義蘊是如何可能的。中國早期中觀哲學承繼了印度中觀哲學「一切法空」的存有論立場，除了緣起、無我、中道與二諦外，特別強調「不二」與「無得正觀」。首先，本文從「我、無我不二」論證「勝義無我」與「世俗我」不相違，也據此論證「無我」與「倫理實踐主體」不相違。再者，依照「無得正觀」的內涵，從「二諦」結構分析「世俗我」如何以空性的存有論理解一切法，並據此深化為對人、我、世界之無執、無得之態度與涵養，此不但影響發動行為的動機，並「踅轉」為一種倫理德性，然而，此「倫理踅轉」必須不斷地回復到空性的存有論才有可能。而朝向涅槃之自利利他的倫理實踐，也在空性的存有論與倫理踅轉之返回結構中具有可能性，此即是中國早期中觀哲學的倫理義蘊及其獨特性。

This paper explores the ontology of early Mādhyamaka philosophy in China, and seeks to establish the possibility of deriving ethical implications from it. The Chinese Mādhyamika adopted the Indian Mādhyamika standpoint that all phenomena are inherently empty. Besides highlighting the theories of dependent origination, non-self, the middle way and the two truths, they further placed special emphasis on non-duality and the right view of non-attainment. From the (Mādhyamaka) perspective of the non-duality of self and non-self, I firstly argue that there is no contradiction between conventional self and ultimate non-self; and on that basis, I seek to demonstrate that non-self is in no way contradictory to the ethically engaged subject. Then, based on the implications of non-attainment, I employ the structure of the two truths to examine how the conventional self, through the ontology of emptiness, allows for an understanding of all dharmas and furthermore, how this serves to deepen nonattachment and enhance the subject's ability to maintain an attitude of non-attainment with respect to the self, others and the world. Apart from arousing the intention to act, this attitude also causes a shift towards a certain ethical virtue, yet such a shift is possible only by way of a continuous return to the ontology of emptiness. Whilst approaching nirvana, the ethical practice of benefiting self and others similarly revolves around the structure of returning to the ontology of emptiness and ethical shift. This ''ethical shift'' is indeed a unique feature of the early Mādhyamaka philosophy in China.