英文摘要 |
Hitchcock (2007) proposes a revised counterfactual analysis of causation. On his view, counterfactual dependence in a self-contained causal network is paradigmatic causation; counterfactual dependence in a causal network that is not self-contained is parasitic dependence. Hitchcock remains agnostic on whether or not parasitic dependence is genuine causation. We argue that it is inadequate to define parasitic dependence in terms of non-self-contained network, nor does the definition successfully capture the intuition of explanatory difference between parasitic and non-parasitic dependence. First, some cases of parasitic dependence in the intuitive sense are counterfactual dependence in a self-contained network, thus belonging to the paradigmatic cases of causation. Second, whether or not a causal network is self-contained is defined by the default/deviant covariance of variables in the network and involves the issue of causal selection. By contrast, whether or not counterfactual dependence is parasitic is contingent upon the fact that some relevant variable outside the network takes a deviant or default value, and related to the issue of satisfactory explanation. Finally, the notion of self-contained network has provided the criteria for judging whether a parasitic dependence relationship is causal. We also refer to some legal decisions to show that certain cases of parasitic dependence are regarded by the court as actual causation in order to attribute responsibility over duty-breaching omissions. |