超越統覺與經驗世界的界限之關係－康德、牟宗三與蓋爾（Paul Guyer）

Transcendental Apperception and the Boundary of Human Experience: Kant, Mou Tsungsan and Paul Guyer

本文說明康德（Immanuel Kant）、蓋爾（Paul Guyer）與牟宗三（Mou Tsungsan）如何透過給予超越統覺（transcendental apperception）不同的詮釋，而分別劃出經驗世界的不同界限。康德主張知性使用範疇綜合統一感性雜多而形成認知對象，超越統覺是知性使用先驗概念綜合統一雜多的功能表現。人類的經驗內容是由感性與知性所共同構造形成，人類經驗的界限落在這兩者的交集之處。蓋爾主張將超越統覺詮釋為一種經驗知識，範疇的客觀有效性則建立在時空的統一整體之上。他認為能夠提供經驗知識的才值得我們去考慮處理，經驗世界的界限應該落在能提供經驗知識的範圍內。牟宗三以認知地物物原則去詮釋超越統覺，認為它是使我們能夠以認知對象的方式去認知的原則。牟宗三認為我們有透過智的直覺越過感性現象界而進入物自身實在界的可能性。
This paper discusses how Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer and Mou Tsungsan offer different accounts of 'transcendental apperception' and how their accounts lead to different notions of boundary of human experience. Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is the function of the understanding that synthesizes representations with a priori concepts. He holds that the interconnection of the sensitivity and the understanding is the boundary of human experience. Guyer explains how to understand 'transcendental apperception' as a form of empirical knowledge of the self. He claims that Kant's theory of time-determination will suffice to describe conditions which experience must meet if we are to be capable of determinate self-consciousness. Mou suggests that 'transcendental apperception' is a principle of the understanding, in particular, to synthesize representations into cognitive objects. Mou claims that we have intellectual intuition, which allows us the possibility to go beyond the phenomenon and to access the noumenon.

This paper discusses how Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer and Mou Tsungsan offer different accounts of 'transcendental apperception' and how their accounts lead to different notions of boundary of human experience. Kant's notion of transcendental apperception is the function of the understanding that synthesizes representations with a priori concepts. He holds that the interconnection of the sensitivity and the understanding is the boundary of human experience. Guyer explains how to understand 'transcendental apperception' as a form of empirical knowledge of the self. He claims that Kant's theory of time-determination will suffice to describe conditions which experience must meet if we are to be capable of determinate self-consciousness. Mou suggests that 'transcendental apperception' is a principle of the understanding, in particular, to synthesize representations into cognitive objects. Mou claims that we have intellectual intuition, which allows us the possibility to go beyond the phenomenon and to access the noumenon.