企業策略、非財務績效衡量與總經理薪酬：電子業證據

Business Strategy, Nonfinancial Performance Measures, and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Electronics Industry

本研究檢視總經理薪酬與非財務績效衡量之間的關係，並探討企業策略對於上述關係是否具有調節效果。本研究使用2000年到2004年間的台灣電子業公司進行實證分析。在控制財務績效衡量後，本研究發現創新績效與製造績效兩個非財務績效衡量與總經理薪酬有正向關聯性。此外，企業策略對於總經理薪酬與非財務績效衡量之間的敏感性具有調節效果。對於採自有品牌經營策略與原廠委託設計製造策略的企業來說，創新績效衡量與總經理薪酬的正向關聯性較製造績效為強。相反地，對於採原廠委託製造策略的企業來說，製造績效衡量與總經理薪酬的正向關聯性較創新績效為強。

This study examines the relationships between CEO compensation and nonfinancial performance measures and, more importantly, whether or not these relationships are moderated by business strategy. The analysis of this study is based on 2000-2004 CEO compensation data gathered from Taiwanese electronics firms. I find, after controlling for financial performance measures, that both innovation and manufacturing performance measures are positively associated with CEO compensation. Furthermore, business strategy moderates the pay-nonfinancial performance sensitivity. For firms adopting OBM strategies and ODM strategies, the positive relationships between innovation performance measures and CEO compensation are stronger than those between manufacturing performance measures and CEO compensation. Conversely, the positive relationships between manufacturing performance measures and CEO compensation are stronger than those between innovation performance measures and CEO compensation for firms pursuing OEM strategies.